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Abstract
This article reports on a study into the use of a subset of stance markers in the Kavanaugh 
confirmation hearing, and it reveals how the choice of these markers is affected by the 
speakers’ interactional roles and communicative purposes. It looks in particular at the 
ways the Supreme Court nominee and his accuser deploy “Believing” mental verbs (think, 
believe, understand) and common communication verbs (say, tell, talk) to orient themselves 
to the epistemic domain. The investigation also demonstrates how the questioners, i.e. the 
Senators and the prosecutor, manifest their attitudes. In sum, the analysis suggests that 
Judge Kavanaugh prefers external domains of reference (communication verbs) whereas 
Christine B. Ford favours internal domains of reference (mental verbs). In this way, 
rational and credibility appeals (logos and ethos) are juxtaposed with affective appeals 
(pathos). Consequently, it is posited, patterns with mental and communication verbs 
determine the degree of certainty projected by the testifying parties.
Keywords
communication verbs, confirmation hearing, epistemic stance, mental verbs, US Supreme 
Court
1 Introduction
Despite the seemingly infinite number of ways in which we can express 
our attitudes, emotions and assessments, we use a limited set of resources 
repeatedly, being culturally “programmed” to do so (Precht 2003: 240). It also 
seems obvious that our expression of stance is shaped not only by culture and 
custom but also the context of use and the audience, and that we adjust the 
choice of stance markers “to frame the way others perceive us” (ibid.: 240). 
Analysis of such linguistic signals, especially those marking epistemic stance, 
becomes even more relevant in institutional contexts where the construction 
of knowledge and certainty affects the perception of speakers’ credibility. One 
such setting – the confirmation hearing of Judge Kavanaugh, Donald Trump’s 
nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States – is the focus of the current 
study showing how the choice of a subset of stance markers, i.e. mental and 
communication verbs, is determined by the speakers’ interactional roles and 
communicative purposes. At the same time, the analysis demonstrates how the 
Discourse and Interaction 12/2/2019, pp. 72-94 
ISSN 1802-9930 
https://doi.org/10.5817/DI2019-2-72
Epistemic Stance in the Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing:  
Focus on Mental and Communication Verbs
73
patterns of use of a selection of verbs identified in other social environments are 
reflected in the current dataset. The examination of several common “Believing” 
mental verbs (think, believe, understand) and communication verbs (say, tell, 
talk) reveals significant differences between the linguistic performances of the 
two testifying parties, who orient themselves to the epistemic domain in their 
own distinctive ways. While Judge Kavanaugh seems to prefer communication 
verbs (i.e. public domains of reference), his accuser, Christine B. Ford relies 
more frequently on mental verbs (i.e. private domains of reference). The analysis 
complements another study into the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing focusing 
on “Knowing” and “Unknowing” mental verbs ((not) know, (not) recall, (not) 
remember) (Szczyrbak 2019, September).
2 Epistemic stance and mental and communication verbs
In discourse-functional approaches, stance is not a static mental concept. 
Instead, this notion refers to an interactive activity and the collaborative 
positioning of discourse subjects and objects (Englebretson 2007). Epistemic 
stance, in particular, refers to “knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of 
concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to 
truth of propositions and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities” 
(Ochs 1996: 410). In a similar vein, as Biber et al. (1999: 972) put it, epistemic 
markers are those that index “certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, or 
limitation; or they can indicate the source of knowledge or the perspective from 
which the information is given”. However, not all scholars share this broad view 
and some of them suggest that the source of knowledge (evidentiality) and the 
assessment of the reliability of this knowledge (epistemicity) should be regarded 
as distinct categories (see e.g. Aikhenvald 2004).
Whatever the approach to the relation between epistemic stance and 
evidentiality, functional linguists seem to agree that speakers use a varied 
repertoire of linguistic means to display their knowledge, no-knowledge or the 
degree of certainty they claim (and negotiate) in interaction. However, the various 
degrees of certainty that can, or should, be assigned to individual markers are not 
always obvious. As an alternative to this, Zuczkowski et al. (2014) posit that the 
epistemic stances speakers claim are reducible to three positions: “Knowing” 
(e.g. I know/recall/remember), “Unknowing” (e.g. I don’t know/recall/remember) 
and “Believing” (e.g. I think/believe/suppose). In their KUB model, the authors 
accommodate both the epistemic and the evidential dimension. As they see it, 
the Knowing position refers to what the speaker presents as certain information 
basing on what s/he perceives (evidentiality) or deducts/infers (epistemicity). 
The Unknowing position, on the other hand, represents the speaker’s lack of 
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knowledge about the information in question which is therefore to be regarded 
as neither certain nor uncertain. Finally, the Believing position, as they propose, 
describes the speaker’s beliefs, opinions, assumptions or doubts, regardless of 
the degree of uncertainty that is being communicated (Zuczkowski et al. 2014: 
127-128). The KUB model has been adopted in the current study and of particular 
interest in the first portion of the investigation (reported in Section 3) are mental 
verbs encoding belief as well as common communication verbs.
As indicated above, epistemic stance can be indexed by an array of lexico-
grammatical markers including mental and communication verbs. These, in turn, 
are considered to be “two sides of the same coin” depicting the same phenomena, 
with mental verbs (such as think) showing phenomena held internally and 
communication (or speech act) verbs (such as say) representing reality which 
is manifested externally (Shinzato 2004: 871, as cited in Brinton 2008: 73). Put 
differently, mental (or cognitive) verbs are “concerned with internal (or private) 
domains of reference, viz. the speaker’s psychological disposition to which s/
he has privileged access” whereas verbs of speaking are concerned with public 
(or external) domains of reference (Fetzer 2014: 70). By using mental verbs, the 
speaker makes explicit subjectively qualified information and thus attributes an 
intersubjective dimension to the private domain (Fetzer 2011: 260). By qualifying 
assertions with public verbs of speaking, on the other hand, the speaker makes it 
clear that s/he “has uttered the proposition before and is uttering it again in order 
to re-assert her/his claim” (ibid.: 261).1
The most common mental verbs include think and believe. However, it is the 
phrase I think that has received the greatest scholarly attention. Its role in discourse 
has been described in different ways, with researchers focusing, for instance, 
on the degree of its pragmaticalisation and its pragmatic marker (or particle) 
status (Aijmer 1997, Fetzer 2014), its comment clause use in conventional and 
variant forms (Kaltenböck 2013) as well as its stance, politeness and discourse 
marker roles in conversation (Kärkkäinen 2003). As has been observed, the 
degree of certainty expressed by I think ranges from ‘doubt’ to ‘lack of doubt’, 
and its meaning depends on prosody, context and position (Mullan 2010). Most 
commonly, I think occurs in intonation unit-initial position and it enables speakers 
to “establish their stance and display a certain orientation towards propositions or 
parts thereof, or to a longer sequence of discourse” (Kärkkäinen 2003: 115). In 
its various positions, I think has been found to act as an organisational discourse 
marker (marking discourse boundaries, initiating a new topic, summing up 
discourse, marking a new perspective in the upcoming turn, marking finality 
or signalling turn completion), a marker of doubt or opinion, or as a recipient-
oriented face-saving device (Mullan 2010: 122).
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Similarly, I believe, which has retained its more determinate meaning, has 
been thoroughly examined, most notably in conjunction with other discourse 
markers (and, but, so). When used in political discourse, it has been proposed, 
and I believe signals the speaker’s firm commitment towards his/her claim and 
indicates that the following argument supports the previous one (Fetzer 2014: 
81). It is also important to note, in line with Verhagen (2005: 76, as cited in Fetzer 
2011: 261), that constructions such as I think or I believe are intersubjective 
since they consist of “instructions to perform inferential operations of a certain 
type, independently of the ‘objective’ content of the utterances”. Simply put, 
constructions with mental verbs take into account the hearer’s perspective and 
guide his/her interpretation of the standpoint expressed in the proposition.
In the same way, communication verbs (also referred to as speech act verbs, 
verbs of speaking or verba dicendi) and their interactional potential have been 
examined from various angles. From a semantic point of view, such verbs belong 
to “verbs of cognition” since they involve the act of transmitting information by 
the speaker who “possesses” it to the recipient who is then transferred from the 
state of “not knowing” the information to the state of “possessing” it (Hirschová 
2009: 1072). Common verbs such as say, tell or talk refer to speech events and 
speakers use them to refer to their own utterances (self-reporting) or to those 
produced by third parties (other-reporting). Given the diversity of this class of 
verbs, it is not surprising, however, that “there is no single verb which would 
contain and convey all aspects of a speech act” and that “there are few verbs 
which are employed to describe only speech acts” (Gawlik 2010: 52 drawing on 
Kleszczowa 1989).
The role of communication verbs in marking attitude in legal settings has 
been addressed, for instance, by Clift and Holt (2007) and Johnson (2014), who 
stress the organising power of reported (embedded) speech and its evaluative 
potential in the courtroom. Likewise, Szczyrbak (2018) draws attention to how 
several patterns with the progressive of verbs of speaking betray the speaker’s 
stance and convey his/her (predominantly negative) assessments. In particular, 
she sees interrogatives with say (Are you saying …?) as part of courtroom 
idiom and a marker of institutionally-based dominance. On the other hand, 
the interactional role of communication verbs in non-legal settings has been 
discussed, for instance, by Gawlik (2010), who notes that in spoken academic 
English, say occurs mostly as a transitive verb followed by prototypical direct 
objects or direct or reported speech, and that it is used chiefly for self-reporting.
Against this background, in Section 3, I discuss the recruitment of several 
mental and communication verbs in the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing held 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 27 September 2018. In doing so, I aim 
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to demonstrate how the highly confrontational public setting and the speakers’ 
interactional roles (accuser vs. alleged offender vs. questioner) influence their 
choice of stancetaking resources which, in turn, affect the perception of their 
authority and credibility.
3	 	Mental	 and	 communication	 verbs	 in	 the	 Kavanaugh	 confirmation	
hearing
3.1 Data
The material examined in this study is drawn from the confirmation hearing 
of Judge Kavanaugh, Donald Trump’s 2018 nominee to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Following the President’s nomination and “the advice and consent 
of the Senate”, Judge Kavanaugh was eventually appointed to the nation’s 
highest court. However, this was preceded by a series of hearings involving 
examination of not only the nominee’s public record and professional credentials 
but also his private background. The 27 September hearing, which was broadcast 
live on television, attracted considerable attention since it concerned last-minute 
allegations of sexual assault, which, if proven, would disqualify the nominee 
shortly before the final vote. Judge Kavanaugh faced a barrage of questions 
related to his conduct in high school and college, aiming to prove or disprove the 
account of the alleged assault presented by Christine B. Ford. The hearing started 
with the accuser’s opening statement which was followed by a question-and-
answer session and the same procedure was repeated with the nominee. Though 
not a criminal proceeding, the hearing involved a professional sex crimes 
prosecutor who conducted the questioning, and both Christine B. Ford and Judge 
Kavanaugh testified under oath. The prosecutor used most of the question time 
allotted to the Republican Senators who chose not to question the accuser directly 
and the questioning was divided into five-minute increments. The transcripts 
used in the analysis (totalling around 50,000 words) were downloaded from the 
Washington Post website while the video of the hearing was accessed via the 
NBC youtube.com channel.2
3.2 Research focus and method
As noted above, both Judge Kavanaugh and Christine B. Ford testified under 
oath; however, the two testimonies were clearly contradictory. As such, they were 
thoroughly scrutinised, with analysts pointing to the holes and inconsistencies 
in the two narratives as well as displays of emotion and meaningful body 
language signals produced by both parties. It should be noted, however, that the 
oftentimes divergent assessments of the credibility of the two witnesses appeared 
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to be affected not only by the analysts’ professional backgrounds but also their 
political affiliations.
The study reported here is intended as an alternative to such assessments and 
it centres on the linguistic make-up of the testimonies, including in particular 
the deployment of several “Believing” mental verbs (think, believe, understand) 
as well as the most frequent communication verbs (say, tell, talk). The analysis 
complements another study into the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing focusing 
on “Knowing” and “Unknowing” mental verbs ((not) know, (not) recall, (not) 
remember) (Szczyrbak 2019, September). Taken together, the two investigations 
provide insight into how various participants in a “he said, she said” type of 
proceeding use mental and communication verbs to orient themselves to the 
epistemic domain and to publicly assert their epistemic positions.
In this portion of the investigation, I address the following questions: 
1) What is the role of “Believing” mental verbs and communication verbs in 
the co-construction of epistemic stance in the data?; 2) How are the patterns 
of use of the analysed verbs linked to the speakers’ interactional roles and 
communicative purposes (accuser vs. alleged offender vs. questioner)?; 3) What 
are the differences, if any, in the ways Judge Kavanaugh and Christine B. Ford 
recruit mental and communication verbs to (re-)assert their claims and build 
credibility?
Toward this end, in the ensuing discussion, I refer both to the quantitative 
data obtained with the use of corpus analysis software (WordSmith Tools) as well 
as the results of a qualitative reading of the transcript and an analysis of the video 
documenting the hearing. Given the focus of the study, the examination centres 
on patterned co-occurrences of present and past forms of selected verbs (think, 
believe, understand) with first-person pronouns, obtained in a corpus query3, the 
results of which were subsequently analysed and ordered manually. To provide 
a broader perspective, where relevant, brief references are also made to other 
verb patterns which emerged during the qualitative analysis of the data (e.g. use 
of the “attention” verbs look and listen and the impersonal phrase would it be 
(also) fair to say).
In the analysis, I try to combine, in a somewhat unorthodox manner, the 
phraseological perspective with what may be gleaned from an examination of the 
sequential organisation of interaction and the design of the contributions made 
by the co-present participants. As a consequence, the study is informed both by 
the assumptions underlying corpus-based studies focusing on recurrent patterns 
and their distribution in large amounts of text (see e.g. Partington et al. 2013) and 
those associated with the conversation-analytic methodology (see e.g. Sidnell 
& Stivers 2013) consisting in detailed examinations of individual interactions 
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(though, admittedly, it differs significantly from traditional CA investigations 
which scrutinise rigorously all prosodic features). I believe that the two 
perspectives may feed into each other and thus provide a fuller picture of how 
subjective meanings arise in spoken interaction.
3.3 Findings
Overall, the examination showed that “Believing” mental verbs and 
communication verbs were not particularly frequent and at first sight the figures 
and the concordance lines did not appear promising. It was only after a careful 
contextual analysis that some patterns began to emerge, revealing significant, 
as it eventually transpired, differences between the linguistic performances of 
the two testifying parties and the ways in which they oriented themselves to the 
epistemic domain. Below is a discussion of the patterns identified in the data, 
reflecting in particular the conflicting communicative aims of the nominee and 
his accuser.
3.3.1 Patterns with “Believing” mental verbs
As it turned out, unsurprisingly, think, and especially the phrase I think, was 
by far the most frequent choice of all the “Believing” verbs analysed in the current 
study, with think being the most common mental verb among all R1 collocates of 
the pronoun I (75 tokens). The phrase seemed to be preferred by the Senators and 
not the testifying parties, although it must be admitted the differences between 
the frequencies of use result also from the fact that the figure provided for the 
questioners does not reflect the contributions made by individual speakers but 
refers to them collectively. A similar pattern was observed in the case of I believe 
(for a list of relevant patterns and their frequencies, see Appendix 1).
In addition, several other regularities emerged. Firstly, the Senators used 
not only the routinised stance frame I think preceding the actual assessment 
(Example 1) but they also chose the I + modifier + think pattern (e.g. I actually 
think, I still think, I really think, I do think, and I just think) indicative of the 
actual process of cogitation (Examples 1 and 2). By contrast, no such uses were 
recognised in the turns of the testifying parties.4 Secondly, parenthetical uses of 
I think, operating as a discourse marker and linked to tentativeness and hedging, 
were found chiefly in the turns of the Senators (Example 3). Identified in the 
data was also the cluster and I think (Example 4), indicating the speaker’s firm 
commitment towards the validity of his/her claim (cf. Fetzer 2014), and it was 
clearly favoured by the Senators as well (11 tokens out of 14).
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(1)  [SEN. CRAPO:] (…) I think5 …. And I just think it should be made clear. I think 
there’s been a lot of back and forth here about, “Oh, we’re not getting information, 
we’re not looking at this. You don’t want to look into the investigation, you don’t 
want to see what happened.” (…)
(2)  [SEN. KLOBUCHAR:] (…) And many people are focused today on what you’re 
not able to remember about that night. I actually think you remember a lot. I’m 
going to phrase it a little differently: can you tell us what you don’t forget about 
that night?
(3)  [SEN. WHITEHOUSE:] You mentioned, I think, the Renate or Renata — I don’t 
know how you pronounce that — that’s a proper name of an individual you know?
(4)  [SEN. CORNYN:] The American — the American people — the American people 
are listening to this, and they will make their decision and I think you’ll come out 
on the right side of that decision.
Turning now to the two testimonies, the first thing to note is that the 
frequency of I + think was rather low (15 tokens – Dr Ford; 12 tokens – Judge 
Kavanaugh) as compared with that observed in the discourse of the Senators 
and the prosecutor (48 tokens).6 Notwithstanding the above, it was the matrix 
clause use of I think with a zero complementiser that was preferred by all the 
participants. On the other hand, I think that – which, as noted by Aijmer (1997: 
21) and Wierzbicka (2006: 38), is more deliberative than I think – was marginal 
and it was found only in the turns of Dr Ford and the Senators (3 tokens in total). 
By contrast, I think that’s + NP appeared both in the discourse of the nominee and 
his opponent (Examples 5 and 6). Interestingly, I think did not occur in either of 
the two (scripted) opening statements. Instead, it was identified in the testifying 
parties’ spontaneous responses, which seems to corroborate the claim that I think 
is predominantly an organisational discourse marker, rather than an epistemic 
one. At the same time, as it transpired, Judge Kavanaugh used the audience-
directed imperative think about that (word/fact) three times in his prepared 
statement (Example 7), thus clearly displaying confidence and claiming control 
over his public performance.7 The negated form I (actually) don’t/do not think, 
adding emphasis, was also preferred by the judge (Example 8). Occasionally, 
however, tentative I think, acting as a discourse marker, was also noted in the 
nominee’s turns (Example 9).
(5)  [DR FORD:] I think that’s a great question. I think the etiology if anxiety and 
PTSD is multifactorial. So that was certainly a critical risk — risk that — we 
would call a risk factor in science, so that would be a predictor of the symptoms 
that I now have. (…)
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(6)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] (…) I think that’s very common. I don’t know if you’ve 
been to a Super Bowl party for example, Senator, and not paid attention to the 
game and just hung out with your friends. I don’t know if you’ve done that or not. 
But that’s what we were referring to in those — those two occasions.
(7)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] Here is the quote from Ms. Keyser’s attorney’s letter: 
quote, “Simply put, Ms. Keyser does not know Mr. Kavanaugh, and she has no 
recollection of ever being at a party or gathering where he was present, with or 
without Dr Ford,” end quote. Think about that fact.
(8)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] I don’t think that — I don’t — I do not think that’s a 
fair characterization, and Chris Dudley’s quoted in that article, and I would refer 
you to what Chris Dudley said. I spent more time with Chris Dudley in college 
than just about anyone, and I would refer you to what he said.
(9)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] No, the — the — we drank beer, and .. yeah … you 
know, so — so did, I think, the vast majority of — of people our age at the time. 
But in any event, we drank beer, and — and still do. So whatever, you know.
On the other hand, the analysis of Dr Ford’s turns revealed that she deployed 
I think mainly in its unmarked position, that is intonation-unit initially (Examples 
10, 11 and 12). It thus became plain that many of these occurrences were linked 
to online planning and lower certainty, as indicated by the co-occurring items and 
the reduced phonological realisation of I think (attested by the video recording).
(10) [ DR FORD:] Well, I think there’s, sort of, biological predispositions that everyone 
in here has for particular disorders. So I can’t rule out that I would have some 
biological predisposition to be, you know…
(11)  [DR FORD:] Correct — I think correct, then. I was interviewing lawyers…
(12)  [DR FORD:] I — I — I think so, it would be possible. I — I’m guessing it would 
be possible, but I don’t know.
Noteworthy was also the co-occurrence of I think/I believe with mental and 
communication verbs, which may be seen as part of the “cultural programming” 
(Precht 2003: 240) and the Anglo-Saxon way of distinguishing between fact and 
opinion (cf. Wierzbicka 2006). Such configurations appeared in the speakers’ 
references to what they themselves heard or described (Examples 13 and 14) 
or to what other participants said (Example 15). When prefaced with I think/I 
believe, the statements seemed less categorical and clearly pointed to the 
speaker’s subjective qualification of the information.
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(13)  [SEN. TILLIS:] (...) I also want to go back to the comments this morning. I think 
I heard — and we can go back to the record if someone disagrees with me — I 
think I heard Dr — Dr Ford say that she wasn’t aware of the fact that we said 
we’d come to California. We’d make it confidential. We’ll completely depose and 
ask any questions you want to. I think I heard her say she wasn’t aware of that. I 
don’t know where that came with counsel or whether counsel just neglected to tell 
her — her counsel. (...)
(14)  [DR FORD:] Well, it’s — it’s impacted me at different stages of the development 
of my life. So the immediate impact was probably the worst, so the first four years. 
I think I described earlier a fairly disastrous first two years of undergraduate 
studies at University of North Carolina, where I was finally able to pull myself 
together. (…)
(15)  [PROSECUTOR MITCHELL:] When we left off, we were still talking about the 
polygraph, and I believe you said it hasn’t been paid for yet. Is that correct?
Finally, a brief mention seems in order on the use of the past form of think. 
The data reveal that I thought was deployed both by Dr Ford and the Senators. 
Judge Kavanaugh, on the other hand, used the we-perspective in the mindsay 
structure we thought, in an attempt to, as may be justifiably assumed, downplay 
his own role and to distance himself from one of the disputed entries in the 
yearbook presented as evidence which might throw light on his earlier conduct 
(Example 16).8
(16)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] One of our friends, Squi, when he said the F word 
starting at a young age, had kind of a wind-up to the F word. Kind of a “ffff.” 
(LAUGHTER). And then the word would come out. And when we were 15, we 
thought that was funny. And it became an inside joke for the — how he would say, 
“Ffff” — and I won’t repeat it here. For the F word.
As for the recruitment of I believe, which was admittedly less frequent 
than I think (27 tokens), it proved to be used chiefly by the Senators. This was 
particularly visible in the case of and I believe (9 tokens), which, like and I 
think, has been described as a booster and a salient discourse pattern in spoken 
political genres (Fetzer 2014: 81). Similarly to and I think, and I believe makes 
explicit the speaker’s chain of argument and indicates “that the argument to 
follow is a firm backing of the previous one” (ibid.), as illustrated by Example 
17. On the other hand, parenthetical I believe, marking conviction due to its 
more determinate semantics (Example 18), was indeed marginal in the data 
(3 tokens) and, again, it was used only by the Senators. Last but not least, I 
believe expressing the speaker’s acceptance of the evidence provided by another 
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speaker was likewise uttered only by the Senators (Example 19). Unsurprisingly, 
the four tokens of I believe you were found only in the turns of the Democratic 
Senators (who opposed Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination) and not those of their 
Republican colleagues. Thus, they publicly sided with the accuser and boosted 
her credibility. Finally, as already indicated, (and) I believe you said was uttered 
by the prosecutor questioning Dr Ford and seeking confirmation of her earlier 
statements (Example 15).
(17)  [SEN. HIRONO:] (…) We should look the question square in the face: does 
character matter? Do our values, our real values about what is right and what 
is wrong, and about whether we treat our fellow human beings with dignity and 
respect, do they matter anymore? I believe they do, and I believe the reaction 
we have seen to this coverage right now, and your courage all over this country 
shows us that we’re not alone, you’re not alone; that women and men all across 
America are disgusted and sick and tired of the way basic human decency has 
been driven from our public life. (…)
(18)  [SEN. BLUMENTHAL:] (…) You’ve made reference, judge, to a sworn statement 
I believe by Mark Judge to the committee. Is that correct?
(19)  [SEN. BLUMENTHAL:] (…) I want to join in thanking you for being here today. 
And just tell you I have found your testimony powerful, incredible and I believe 
you. You’re a teacher, correct?
The last of the three “Believing” mental verbs discussed here is understand, 
which has received less scholarly attention than think and believe. The analysis 
of the distribution and function of I understand in the data has, again, revealed 
that it was preferred by the committee members (17 tokens) and not the 
testifying parties (4 tokens). Various patterns with understand clearly had a 
monitoring function and they appeared in contexts where the speakers hedged 
their utterances and/or checked their understanding by eliciting a response from 
the addressee (Examples 20 and 21). Given its role in discourse, I understand 
appeared in the clusters if I understand (it/sth correctly), and I understand and 
as I understand. Interestingly, (this/that/it/here) (is/was) my understanding 
also resurfaced as a noteworthy pattern (with 7 tokens identified in the turns of 
Judge Kavanaugh and 6 tokens in the turns of the Senators). By analogy to other 
constructions with possessive pronouns (e.g. it is my belief), also this pattern 
may be seen as the speaker’s attempt to distance him-/herself from the claim 
being made by modifying the level of agency and responsibility for his/her words 
(cf. Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990: 225, as cited in Dontcheva-Navratilova 2011: 
115). On the other hand, in the context of a judicial proceeding, confirmatory it’s 
my understanding produced in response to a question can additionally mark the 
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speaker’s relative certainty as well as imply that the information provided may, 
in fact, be incorrect (Example 22). This has naturally not only pragmatic but also 
legal implications given that the testimony is provided under oath.
(20)  [SEN. CRAPO:] (...) I’m not going to get to that unless I have time. I want to 
talk about what happened in the Senate committee’s investigation. Because as I 
understand it — and this may be more of a question to the chairman — as soon as 
we received information, which was about 45 days after others on the committee 
received it, we conducted an investigation. Is that correct, Mr. Chairman? (...)
(21)  [SEN. FEINSTEIN:] … And — and what you’re saying, if — if I understand it, is 
that the allegations by Dr Ford, Ms. Ramirez and Ms. Swetnick are — are wrong?
(22)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] It’s my understanding, yeah. Well — I had a meeting, 
and that’s my understanding of the date.
3.3.2 Patterns with communication verbs
Beside the patterns with think, believe and understand, in the data at hand, 
I have also examined various configurations of the pronouns I and we with the 
most common communication verbs, i.e. say, tell and talk (for a list of relevant 
patterns and their frequencies, see Appendix 2). At the outset, it should be 
admitted that although these verbs were identified in self-reporting structures, 
their frequencies were not spectacularly high, and they were complemented 
by the speakers’ use of visual (I saw/we saw) and auditory (I heard/we heard) 
perception markers which fall outside the scope of this analysis.9
With regard to reporting signals marking public domains of reference, as 
predicted, say turned out to be the most frequent choice, especially (when) I 
say and I said (Examples 23 and 24). This ties in with interactional linguists’ 
claim that speakers not only make explicit their personal stance and epistemic 
attitude towards the information they share but also “provide evidence for their 
conversational contributions should these be queried or challenged” (Fetzer 2014: 
74). In the dataset analysed, it was revealed that the Senators and the prosecutor 
opted for (when) I say linked to clarification and reformulation (4 tokens) whereas 
Judge Kavanaugh chose I said-patterns to re-affirm his earlier claims (10 tokens), 
as did the Senators (5 tokens) and Dr Ford (4 tokens), albeit less frequently.
Visibly absent, in turn, were the phraseologies as/what I’m saying and 
I’m not saying typical of the adversarial procedure involving the turn-by-turn 
negotiation of epistemic priority (Szczyrbak 2018). In the data under study, 
probably due to the format of the proceeding, such interactional patterns were 
not identified except for one use by Judge Kavanaugh firmly rejecting earlier 
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allegations of sexual misconduct (Example 25). Here, it should be mentioned 
that unlike the adversarial procedure, the confirmation hearing does not involve 
cross-examination and so there is no direct confrontation of contradictory 
testimonies, aiming to win the positive regard of the presiding judge (and, where 
applicable, the jury) by requiring that the witnesses confirm or disconfirm their 
counsel’s version of events. Understandably, then, patterns with communication 
verbs such as say differ in the two settings.
(23)   [PROSECUTOR MITCHELL:] And when I say informally, I mean just a — 
a female complains. It doesn’t have to be to anybody else but you.
(24)   [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] Senator, I said in my opening statement that she 
preferred confidentially. And her confidentially was — was destroyed by the 
actions of this committee.
(25)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] Yes, that — that is emphatically what I’m saying; 
emphatically. The Swetnick thing is a joke. That is a farce.
Unlike say discussed above, talk (having about, with, and to as its most 
frequent R1 collocates) tended to focus on the subject of the ongoing interaction, 
rather than the speakers themselves, and as such it was found mainly in the 
progressive form preceded by the pronoun we (Example 26). The use of inclusive 
we, it may be argued, suggested a shared epistemic perspective and aimed to 
draw the audience into the discourse. On the other hand, authority-oriented 
I’m talking about was used mainly for clarification or disambiguation purposes 
(Example 27).
(26)  [PROSECUTOR MITCHELL:] Is there anything that could even remotely fit 
what we’re talking about, in terms of Dr Ford’s allegations?
(27)  [PROSECUTOR MITCHELL:] Prior to your nomination for Supreme Court, 
you’ve talked about all of the female clerks you’ve had, and the women that 
you’ve worked with. I’m not just talking about them; I’m talking about globally. 
Have you ever been accused, either formally or informally, of unwanted sexual 
behavior?
Several interesting observations were also made about the verb tell. In line 
with earlier research looking at the patterns with tell in the courtroom setting 
(Szczyrbak 2018), it was discovered that patterns with tell almost always 
indicated the audience. A clear difference was to be seen, however, between the 
testimonies provided by Judge Kavanaugh and Christine B. Ford. The nominee 
plainly oriented himself to the co-present committee members addressing them 
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directly (you, this committee) whilst reasserting his earlier claims (Example 28), 
or saying that he was telling the truth (Example 29). Dr Ford, in turn, referred 
to what she had (or not) disclosed (my whole life story, the details) and to whom 
(a couple of close friends, my husband). Thus, Judge Kavanaugh reaffirmed his 
earlier claims produced before the same audience, showing their relevance to 
the ongoing interaction whereas Dr Ford focused on more distant events which 
concerned spatially and temporally remote addressees (Example 30). Thus, 
it became evident that the temporal orientations of the two speakers differed 
(which was further corroborated by the absence of the present progressives I’m 
saying and I’m telling in Dr Ford’s turns).
(28)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] (…) But today, I have to say that I fear for the 
future. Last time I was here, I told this committee that a federal judge must be 
independent, not swayed by public or political pressure. (...)
(29)  [JUDGE KAVANAUGH:] I — I welcome whatever the committee wants to do, 
because I’m telling the truth.
(30)  [DR FORD:] Over the years, I told very, very few friends that I had this traumatic 
experience. I told my husband before we were married that I had experienced a 
sexual assault. I had never told the details to anyone — the specific details — 
until May 2012, during a couples counselling session.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that examination of patterns with mental and 
communication verbs can shed light on how speakers orient themselves to the 
epistemic domain and, consequently, how they frame the way others perceive 
them (Precht 2003: 240) in a high stake public encounter. I have also demonstrated 
that the stancetaking strategies selected by the participants in the confirmation 
hearing reflected not only their status in the interaction but also their pragmatic 
motivations. In particular, my goal was to investigate the choice of several 
“Believing” mental verbs (think, believe, understand) by the two testifying parties 
as well as their recruitment of the most common communication verbs (say, tell, 
talk). I also looked at how the questioners (the Senators and the prosecutor) 
manifested their attitudes. My observations can be summarised as follows:
1.  Although the corpus was relatively small and the number of patterned 
co-occurrences was low, a detailed contextual examination revealed 
significant differences between the ways in which Judge Kavanaugh and 
Christine B. Ford communicated their assessments and epistemic positions. 
As already noted, the nominee tended to use communication verbs to reassert 
Magdalena Szczyrbak
86
his earlier claims in front of the same audience (I said, I’m saying, I told this 
committee, I’m telling you) whereas the accuser more frequently relied on 
“Believing” mental verbs (I think/I thought, I believe (so)) and referred to 
spatially and temporally remote events. This suggests that the judge preferred 
external domains of reference (apparently avoiding references to his inner 
thoughts and feelings). His accuser, on the contrary, focused on internal 
domains of reference (foregrounding her own mental operations) more 
than on the outward projection of her epistemic position. In addition, Judge 
Kavanaugh displayed more confidence and claimed control over his own 
linguistic performance10, as evidenced by the absence of explicit markers of 
doubt, the infrequent use of markers of belief and, finally, the presence of 
imperatives directing the audience to accept his argument (think about that 
fact; look at what I said; I say listen to both sides). Following the Aristotelian 
model of persuasion, we may thus conclude that Judge Kavanaugh resorted 
to rational and credibility appeals (logos and ethos), which might be 
attributable to his legal training, while his adversary demonstrably sought 
to influence the audience through affective appeals (pathos), which is also 
understandable given the subject matter of the hearing and Dr Ford’s status 
of an alleged victim.
2.  Looking at the individual turns-at-talk and the exchanges between the 
questioners and the testifying parties, it was also possible to see that the 
Senators and the prosecutor tailored their interactional strategies to their own 
rhetorical ends. As the data bore out, most of the mental verbs under study 
were found in the turns of the Senators and their configurations were consistent 
with earlier research identifying salient discourse patterns in political genres 
(and I think; and I believe). On the other hand, the turns of the prosecutor 
revealed patterns typical of courtroom examinations (would it be fair to say; 
I believe you said). It was also noted that the Senators’ political affiliations 
(and, arguably, their political motivations) were reflected in their discourse. 
For instance, it was only in the turns of the Democrats that the phrase I believe 
you was found, which, as may be speculated, aimed at boosting Dr Ford’s 
credibility and undermining Judge Kavanaugh’s integrity. Another discovery 
was the questioners’ use of if/and/as I understand whereby they checked their 
comprehension or decreased the illocutionary force of their statements.
3.  Regarding the methodological approach taken, the current investigation 
strengthened my belief that given the multidimensionality of discourse 
analysis, a quantitatively-oriented examination cannot fully account for all 
the subjective meanings which arise in spoken interaction. However rigorous 
the analytical criteria, serendipitous discoveries in spoken data can indeed 
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prove as revealing as the results of a study following pre-defined parameters 
of analysis. Such was the case with some of the patterns which emerged 
in this study after a careful reading of the transcript and an analysis of the 
video-recorded testimonies. Reliance on the concordance lines and the 
frequencies alone would not have led to the same conclusions. In addition, the 
analysis has shown that stance and evaluation are truly cumulative and that their 
subtleties may escape notice if only statistical figures are considered. Along 
the same lines, it should be emphasised that some contextual configurations 
stand out not because of their frequency but for other reasons. Therefore, 
to capture the interplay of various epistemic markers, however frequent or 
infrequent they are, an inquisitive analyst should supplement quantitative 
analyses with qualitative interpretations, for which small specialised corpora 
seem fit (cf. Johnson 2014).
4.  Finally, I hope to have demonstrated that Judge Kavanaugh and Christine 
B. Ford sought to communicate their respective truths and to build their 
credibility in differing linguistic ways. To have a fuller picture of how the two 
speakers positioned themselves with regard to the co-participants’ epistemic 
stances – and to see how they used the verbs know, recall and remember 
to make claims of knowledge and no-knowledge – the reader is referred to 
the second portion of the study reported in Szczyrbak (2019, September). 
What can be established already at this point, however, is that a linguist 
cannot offer an unequivocal assessment of the testifying parties’ veracity 
because it is not clear whether their mental states corresponded to what they 
manifested discursively in what will probably be remembered as one of the 
most memorable and spectacular confirmation hearings in US history.
Notes
1  To illustrate this difference, Fetzer (2011: 260) contrasts the utterance “I think this is a tough view 
of the world” with “I say this is a tough view of the world” [emphasis mine], arguing that the 
former has the status of a personal opinion while the latter re-asserts the speaker’s earlier claim. 
Fetzer (2014: 71) also posits that a public-domain reference such as I say or I mean may be used 
to reformulate or add a qualification to the speaker’s prior qualification.
2  For the reader’s convenience – as well as to enable comparison with other datasets – the number 
of words appearing, respectively, in the turns of Judge Kavanaugh, Christine B. Ford and the 
Senators has been provided in the appendices. However, due to the relatively low number of 
individual verb forms, only raw counts have been included.
3 In the query, the verbs under study were the node words and the search horizon was set at 5L.
4 Except for one occurrence of the negated form I actually don’t think uttered by Judge Kavanaugh.
5 Here and in the following examples the emphasis is mine.
6  This may however result from the differences between the respective talking times of individual 




7  It is also interesting to note that a similar pattern was observed in the case of the “attention” verbs 
look and listen (which, however, are not within the scope of this study). To boost his credibility, 
when addressing the committee, Judge Kavanaugh uttered the imperatives look eleven times and 
listen six times, drawing the hearers’ attention to third-party evidence corroborating his testimony. 
No such structures were found in Dr Ford’s discourse and she appeared to be the only source of 
information on the alleged assault.
8  It was suggested during the hearing that the “I survived the FFFFFFFourth of July” entry had 
sexual connotations and that it was a form of bragging about a sexual conquest. According to the 
urbandictionary.com, “7Fs” denotes: “find them, french them, feel them, finger them, fuck them, 
forget them, forever.” According to Judge Kavanaugh, the entry referred to the way in which one 
of his friends pronounced the “F word”. This explanation, however, seems implausible given that 
the “I” pronoun used in the entry referred to the judge himself.
9  It should also be reiterated that since patterned co-occurrences of say, tell and talk with other 
pronouns were excluded from the current study, other-reporting structures are not addressed here, 
either.
10  It must, however, be admitted that there were moments when the judge could not control his 
emotions and bodily reactions as can be plainly seen in the recording of the hearing.
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... I think ... 
[parenthetical]
as I think 
[parenthetical]
and I think (that)





















































I actually think 1 0 0 1
I still think 1 0 0 1
I really think 1 0 0 1
I do think 1 0 0 1
and I just think 2 0 0 2
I can think of 1 0 0 1
not that I can 
think of 1 1 0 0
I don’t think 7 1 3 3
I do not think 2 0 1 1
I actually don’t 
think 1 0 1 0
I don’t think so 1 0 1 0
I can’t think 1 0 0 1
I didn’t think 3 1 0 2
I thought 10 5 0 5
we thought 1 0 1 0
*think (about 
that) [imperative] 3 0 3 0
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I believe that 
































































if I understand (it/sth. 
correctly)
as I understand

































I do understand 1 0 0 1
I understood 3 1 0 2
I’m not understanding 1 1 0 0
we understood 1 0 0 1












































I will say 3 0 1 2
I’ll (just) say 2 0 1 1
I’d (just) like 
to say 1 0 0 1
I want to say 2 0 0 2
I can say 1 0 0 1
I would say/ I’d 
say 3 1 2 0
I have to say 2 0 1 1
I hate to say 2 0 0 2
let me say 3 0 0 3
let’s say 1 0 0 1






























































I was going to say 1 1 0 0
we had said 1 0 0 1
*would it be (also) 
fair to say 6 0 0 6
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I would always 
tell 1 0 0 1
I can tell you 1 0 0 1
I could tell 
the information 1 1 0 0
I want to tell you 1 0 0 1
I just wanted to 
tell you 1 0 0 1
I did not want 
to tell 1 1 0 0
I would tell you 1 0 0 1
I’m here today to 
tell the truth 1 0 1 0
I’ve told my 
colleagues 1 0 0 1
I TOLD
I told my whole 
life story





I told + third party 
[a couple of 
close friends; 



















I had never told 
[the details] 1 1 0 0
I AM TELLING















we tell the FBI 1 0 0 1
I’VE TALKED














I’ll talk to 1 0 1 0
I’m going to talk 
about 2 0 2 0
I don’t usually to 
[sic!] talk about 1 0 1 0
I want to talk 
(to you) about 3 0 0 3
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I don’t want to 
talk about 1 1 0 0
I talked with 1 1 0 0
I also talked to 1 1 0 0
I had talked about 1 1 0 0
I haven’t talked to 1 0 1 0
I haven’t talked 
with 1 1 0 0
I’m talking about 5 0 1 4
I’m not (just) 
talking about 2 0 1 1
I’m only talking 
about 1 0 0 1
I wasn’t talking 
about 1 0 1 0
we can talk to 1 0 0 1
we want to talk 
about 1 0 1 0
we’ve been 




















talking about 1 0 0 1
we were (still) 
talking about 2 0 0 2
TOTAL 127 21 44 62
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